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Abstract—As vehicle maneuver data becomes abundant for
assisted or autonomous driving, their implication of privacy
invasion/leakage has become an increasing concern. In particular,
the surface for fingerprinting a driver will expand significantly
if the driver’s identity can be linked with the data collected from
his mobile or wearable devices which are widely deployed world-
wide and have increasing sensing capabilities.
In line with this trend, this paper investigates a fast emerging
driving data source that has driver’s privacy implications. We
first show that such privacy threats can be materialized via any
mobile device with IMUs (e.g., gyroscope and accelerometer).
We then present Dri-Fi (Driver Fingerprint), a driving data
analytic engine that can fingerprint the driver with vehicle
turn(s). Dri-Fi achieves this based on IMUs data taken only
during the vehicle’s turn(s). Such an approach expands the attack
surface significantly compared to existing driver fingerprinting
schemes. From this data, Dri-Fi extracts three new features
— acceleration along the end-of-turn axis, its deviation, and
the deviation of the yaw rate — and exploits them to identify
the driver. Our extensive evaluation shows that an adversary
equipped with Dri-Fi can correctly fingerprint the driver within
just one turn with 74.1%, 83.5%, and 90.8% accuracy across 12,
8, and 5 drivers — typical of an immediate family or close-friends
circle — respectively. Moreover, with measurements on more than
one turn, the adversary can achieve up to 95.3%, 95.4%, and
96.6% accuracy across 12, 8, and 5 drivers, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
As data of vehicle maneuver becomes abundant for as-
sisted or autonomous driving, their implication of privacy
invasion/leakage has become an increasing concern. To prevent
potential privacy violations, the U.S. Congress has enacted a
law for enforcing driving data privacy in Dec. 2015 [1]. In
particular, the law forbids disclosure of personally identifiable
information of the owner or the lessee of the vehicle. In Dec.
2016, NHTSA also enforced the protection of any data that
can be “reasonably linkable” to driver identification [2].
Despite these legislations, researchers have demonstrated
that driver’s privacy can indeed be breached by accessing
in-vehicle data through an On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II)
dongle. For example, the authors of [3, 4] showed that the
driver’s identity can be revealed by analyzing the vehicle’s
Controller Area Network (CAN) data collected through the
OBD-II port. Although this could be a severe privacy threat, its
practicability/feasibility has been questioned for two reasons.
First, due to security concerns, car manufacturers are begin-
ning to restrict the OBD-II port access, i.e., allowing its access
only during diagnostics (while the vehicle is parked) [5]. Sec-
ond, even with OBD-II access, existing driver-fingerprinting
*The authors equally contributed to this work.
schemes require a time-consuming task of reverse engineering
in-vehicle data [6, 7]. All of these together make it very
difficult to invade the driver’s privacy via the OBD-II port.
Due to the nature of in-vehicle data being obscure and
difficult to access (e.g., physical access to one’s car), re-
searchers/developers increasingly use IMUs — available on
various devices such as smartphones, OEM-authorized OBD-
II dongles, and wearables — as an alternative source of driving
data for enhancing driving experience and safety. This use of
IMUs in the automotive ecosystem has led to the development
of various “beneficial” (c.f. malicious) applications such as
driving-assistance systems [8], adjustable auto insurance [9],
and fuel-efficient navigations.
Collection and exploitation of IMU data also create con-
cerns of breaching drivers’ privacy. In particular, data-
collection entities might be able to infer the driver’s identity
from the collected IMU data, leading to an incontrovertible
breach of the driver’s privacy. This paper focuses on the
driver’s identity privacy, and hence questions “Would existing
schemes on mobile devices breach the driver’s privacy? Can
an adversary with access to only IMU data achieve it?”
On one hand, researchers have shown that one’s privacy can
be breached if his/her device is identified/tracked via stealthy
identifiers available on the device. For example, by leveraging
the imperfection of IMU components [10, 11] or non-cookie
web tracking techniques (e.g., supercookies [12]) on a mobile
device, an adversary can identify the device and/or its user.
On the other hand, instead of identifying the device itself (and
hence its owner), other existing schemes attempt to identify
the user through his/her behavior or interaction with the device
(e.g., touch screen behavior [13], DNS traffic pattern [14]).
Although these existing schemes indeed breach privacy of
the device owner/user, they do not necessarily breach the
actual driver’s privacy. For example, suppose driving data was
collected from a smartphone while its owner was in a car as a
passenger. In such a case, the collected data did not originate
from the actual driver’s device, and hence will not help identify
the driver. Similarly, existing schemes cannot identify the
driver when someone simply takes his phone and then goes
on for a drive. Meanwhile, an interesting but yet unanswered
question is “if an adversary reads and analyzes the IMU data in
more depth, would the consequences be different?” Behind the
paradigm shift of how devices (equipped with IMUs) are being
used/integrated in contemporary automotive ecosystems (e.g.,
vehicle authentication via smartphones, event data recording
via IMUs), there could exist many uncovered scenarios where
the driver’s privacy could be unintentionally breached.
In this paper, we propose a new driver fingerprinting scheme
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called Dri-Fi (Driver Fingerprint), which can be used by
an adversary to stealthily infer the driver’s identity based on
the readings of zero-permission mobile IMUs, i.e., gyroscope,
accelerometer, and magnetometer. By developing and using
Dri-Fi, we focus on the risk of breaching the driver’s privacy
based on driving data that is far more easily obtainable and
accessible than in-vehicle data, i.e., IMU data.
The key challenge for Dri-Fi to fingerprint drivers is
that it has much less information available than the existing
schemes that use in-vehicle data [3, 4]; all Dri-Fi has
is access to IMU sensor readings. Dri-Fi overcomes this
challenge by constructing a driving behavior profile based on
the drivers’ turning maneuver — a common yet representative
maneuver. There are two reasons for using vehicle “turns”
to represent the driver’s behavior: 1) turns are behavior-rich
actions that reflect how the driver accelerates/decelerates, and
at the same time, how s/he steers, and 2) turns are less likely
to be affected by traffic conditions than other maneuvers. For
example, deceleration can be affected greatly by the frontal
car whereas turns are not. So, once Dri-Fi detects a turn,
it derives three new features: 1) the acceleration along the
end-of-turn axis, which is defined as the axis orthogonal to
the vehicle’s direction when the turn started, 2) the deviation
in the first feature, and 3) the deviation in the yaw rate.
These features function as the cornerstone of Dri-Fi’s driver
fingerprinting as they reflect the driver’s unique behavior —
they are only affected by how the driver actually turns the
steering wheel or how s/he presses the acceleration/brake pedal
while making a turn. Our extensive experimental evaluation
will later show that these features vary only with drivers,
but not with car models or trip routes. Once these three
features are derived for a detected turn, Dri-Fi computes
various percentiles and their autocorrelations which are then
used to construct the feature vector for machine classifiers,
such as Naive Bayes, SVM, and Random Forest. Dri-Fi
can, therefore, fingerprint the driver with a high probability,
even when s/he makes just one left/right turn. As more turns
are made by the driver within a trip, Dri-Fi exploits such
accumulated information for driver fingerprinting to reduce
false positives/negatives, enhancing its accuracy. In addition
to the driver fingerprinting, we also discuss how an adver-
sary may utilize its IMU measurements to construct a well-
formulated training dataset from scratch, which is essential
for the underlying machine classifiers. Note that all existing
studies (had to) assume the training dataset, which has the
correct labels of all targeted drivers, was given to the adversary,
which may not hold in practice.
We evaluated Dri-Fi extensively by collecting IMU data
from a smartphone while 12 different drivers (9 males, 3
females) were driving either around the campus or in an ur-
ban/rural area. Our results have shown that by using Dri-Fi,
the driver can be identified within one left/right turn, with
accuracies of 74.1%, 83.5%, and 90.8% across 12, 8, and 5
drivers1 respectively. Dri-Fi’s achievement of high accuracy
with just one turn implies a severe driver privacy invasion.
Also, Dri-Fi’s performance is in sharp contrast to existing
studies that require several minutes of measurements from tens
of in-car sensors. As the driver made 8 turns, Dri-Fi was
able to achieve accuracies of 95.3%, 95.4%, and 96.6% across
12, 8, and 5 drivers, respectively.
This paper makes the following main contributions:
1. Discovery of three new features which are shown to
be distinct between different drivers and independent of
vehicles and trip routes (Sec. III);
2. Development of Dri-Fi, which extracts the new fea-
tures when the driver makes a left/right turn, and thus
achieves driver fingerprinting (as soon as the driver makes
a turn) with high accuracy (Sec. III);
3. Implementation and extensive evaluation of Dri-Fi
using commodity smartphones (Sec. IV).
II. MOTIVATION, ADVERSARY MODEL, AND GOAL
Although the abundance of driving-related data has brought
various benefits to our lives, their availability can also breach
the driver’s privacy.
A. Why Not Fingerprinting Drivers with In-car Data?
An adversary with access to sensors on an in-vehicle
network, such as the Controller Area Network (CAN), can
fingerprint the driver [3, 4, 15–17]. (Such schemes will be
detailed in Sec. V.) Despite the rich and low-noise in-car
data for the adversary to fingerprint drivers, s/he must meet
the following two minimum requirements to acquire the data,
which are assumed to have been met in all existing studies.
Access to In-car Data. To read and extract values of
sensors on an in-vehicle network, the adversary must have
access to the sensors data. To gain such an access, s/he may
either 1) remotely compromise an Electronic Control Unit
(ECU), or 2) have a compromised OBD-II dongle plugged
in the victim’s vehicle in order to read in-car data.2 For the
first case, however, depending on the ECU that the adversary
compromised, s/he may not be able to read all sensors data
of interest, mainly because the ECUs which produce those
data may reside in different in-vehicle networks (e.g., some
on high-speed CAN and others on low-speed CAN). For the
second case, the adversary has indeed control of a plugged-in
and compromised OBD-II dongle, and therefore, in contrast to
a compromised ECU, is likely to have access to all sensors data
of interest (as shown in [3, 17]). However, for security reasons,
car manufacturers are increasingly blocking/restricting in-car
data access through the OBD-II port except when the vehicle
is parked [5]. Thus, the adversary will less likely be able to
access in-car data.
1The selection of this number of drivers is to reflect real-life scenarios,
covering immediate family members, close friends and colleagues, etc.
2Note that drivers may try to lower their auto-insurance rates by plugging
in OBD-II dongles provided by the insurance companies, or use them for 24/7
monitoring of the health of their cars. It has been shown that these dongles
can also be compromised by adversaries [18].
2
Reverse-engineering Messages. Even when the adversary
has access to in-vehicle network messages, s/he must still
(i) understand where and in which message the sensor data
(of interest) is contained, and (ii) translate them into ac-
tual sensor values (e.g., transformation coefficients for addi-
tion/multiplication of raw sensor data [3]). In-vehicle network
messages are encoded by the vehicle manufacturers and the
“decoding book,” which allows one to translate the raw data is
proprietary to them. Therefore, unless the adversary has access
to such a translator, s/he would have to reverse-engineer the
messages, which is often painstaking and incomplete.
Although the adversary may have abundant resources to
fingerprint the driver, meeting the above two requirements may
be difficult or even not possible.
B. Adversary Model
Due to the difficulty and (even) impracticality of an adver-
sary fingerprinting the driver via in-vehicle (CAN-bus) data,
we consider the following adversary who might fingerprint the
driver without the difficulties of state-of-the-art solutions. In
particular, we consider the adversary with a data-collection
entity that aims to fingerprint the driver based on zero-
permission mobile IMU data. We assume that the adversary
has access to the target’s mobile IMU data while s/he was
driving. As mobile IMUs are available in various commodity
mobile/wearable devices such as smartphones, watches, and
even in OBD-II dongles, the adversary can compromise one
of them (belonging to the target), and obtain the required IMU
data for driver fingerprinting. This means that the adversary
would have a much larger attack surface than existing driver
fingerprinting schemes. One example of such an adversary
would be a smartphone malware programmer who builds
an app to stealthily collect the target’s IMU data. Another
example could be a car insurance company that might reveal
information other than what was initially agreed on via the
collected/stored IMU data available on its OBD-II dongles.
C. Motivating Scenarios
Integrating mobile IMU sensors with the automotive ecosys-
tem can, on one hand, lead to development of numerous benefi-
cial apps. On the other hand, it may violate the driver’s privacy.
In what follows, we state three double-edged-sword scenarios,
which at first glance seem beneficial for our daily driving
experience but could lead to a severe privacy violation; in fact,
more severe than what has already been studied/uncovered.
1) Vehicle Authentication: To enable a more convenient
car-sharing experience, car companies, such as Volvo [19] and
Tesla [20], started to let car owners unlock and start their
cars (e.g. new Tesla model 3) by using their smartphone apps,
thus replacing a key fob with a smartphone. By installing this
authorized app, the car owner first designates eligible drivers
as a whitelist. All allowed drivers can then unlock and start
the car with authentication through the Bluetooth link between
the car and their smartphones.
Privacy violation case. Alice owns a car with this function-
ality. Her husband Bob’s driver’s license was suspended. So,
Alice is unable to register him as a driver in the whitelist,
due to a background check conducted by the car company.
One day, Alice asks Bob to drive the car for some reasons. To
evade the driver authentication, Alice temporarily gives Bob
her phone to drive the car. However, if the car company’s
app had stored IMU data and thus had the driving profiles of
all whitelisted drivers, with the capability of identifying the
driver from IMU data, the car company can determine that
the current driving pattern (which is Bob’s) does not match
with any of the whitelisted. This becomes a definite privacy
violation if the car company had initially stated/claimed that
all the IMU data (while driving) reveals how the car moves,
not who actually drives it. However, the driver’s identity can
be found via in-depth analysis.
2) Named Driver Exclusion: Many states in the U.S. permit
“named driver exclusion” to allow auto insurance buyers to
reduce their premium [21, 22]. Under this plan, the insurance
company will not accept any excuses for allowing the excluded
person to drive. Therefore, Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) specifically warns all drivers of the fact that, to
avoid driving without any insurance coverage, the excluded
individuals should not drive the insuree’s car [23].
Privacy violation case. Suppose Bob’s wife, Alice, is a
legitimate driver. However, to reduce the cost of their family
insurance plan, Bob excludes Alice from the plan. Bob’s
smartphone has installed the insurance company’s app, which
not only manages his insurance account but also keeps record
of the driving IMU data as an Event Data Recorder (EDR).3
One night, Bob was in a bad physical condition and hence
asked Alice to drive him home. Unfortunately, they ran into
an incident. At the court, the insurance company defended
itself by showing the driving IMU data — measured during
that night when the accident occurred — matched Alice’s, not
Bob’s, driving profile. Thus, the company refused to reimburse
Bob and won the lawsuit. Note that the initial purpose of EDR
functionality on the app was not for driver fingerprinting but
for recording events, an undetermined privacy violation.
3) Utilization of IMU Data: Unlike conventional OBD-
II dongles (designed for diagnostics), car manufacturers are
designing and developing a new type of dongle, which does
not provide users with raw CAN data but provides them in a
“translated” format (e.g., JSON format). Ford OpenXC [24]
and Intel-based OBD-II dongles [25] are examples of such a
design. This way, the car OEMs’ plugged-in dongle reads and
translates metrics from the car’s internal network and provides
them to the user without revealing proprietary information.
Thus, while providing the necessary information to the users,
car OEMs can let them install vehicle-aware apps which
have better interfaces based on a context that can minimize
distraction while driving [24].
Privacy violation case. Alice has the car OEM’s dongle,
which provides her the translated CAN data, plugged in her car
so that she can gain more insight into her car operation. Due
3EDR is used for getting a detailed picture of the seconds right before and
after a crash.
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Figure 1. System overview of Dri-Fi.
to a security breach on the dongle, suppose Mallory has access
to the data being read from the dongle, but only in a translated
format. Note that even with access to raw CAN data, Mallory
would still need to reverse engineer the messages; we are
relaxing the technical requirements for Mallory. He may fail
because the translated data that Mallory has access might not
contain the required information for in-car-data-based driver
fingerprinting. Note that the most significant feature used
for driver fingerprinting in [3] was the brake pedal position,
which unfortunately is not provided by the Ford OpenXC [24].
However, since those dongles are always equipped with IMUs
for data calibration, Mallory uses his malware to read the
IMUs instead, and thus attempts to identify the driver. This
implies that Mallory might not even need to access the
translated data at all, thus lowering the technical barrier for
the adversary. Through security by obscurity, the translation
of data itself might provide some sort of privacy. However,
the IMUs installed on those dongles, designed for calibration,
might ironically threaten the driver’s privacy.
D. Our Goal
To breach the driver’s privacy, the adversary needs an
efficient way of fingerprinting the driver solely based on IMU
data. Researchers have already demonstrated the feasibility of
an adversary breaching the driver’s privacy by fingerprinting
him/her with in-car data. We refer to such an adversary as a
high-resource adversary due to his/her access to the rich and
low-noise in-car data. However, we still do not know if a low-
resource adversary, with access to only the target’s IMU data,
can fingerprint the driver; it may even be infeasible due to
his/her insufficient resource(s). Therefore, our goal is to shed
light on an unexplored but important question: “Within a short
duration, can a low-resource adversary fingerprint the driver,
i.e., having access to only IMUs?”
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
We propose Dri-Fi, which acquires IMU sensor mea-
surements from the victim/target driver and exploits them for
identifying the driver.
A. Overview of Dri-Fi
Fig. 1 presents a high-level overview of Dri-Fi as a
4-step process where the adversary acquires the required
raw IMU sensor data ϕxraw for fingerprinting driver x. The
data can be acquired either at the end of, or periodically
during a trip. First, Dri-Fi pre-processes ϕxraw to remove
noises and extracts the sensor measurements only while x
was making a (left/right) turn (Sections III-B–III-C). So,
it obtains ϕxturn. Next, based on the thus-obtained ϕ
x
turn,
Dri-Fi constructs a set of features, i.e., a feature vector
γxturn. Then, based on a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
(to be detailed in Section III-F), the adversary first verifies
whether γxturn closely matches any of his/her previously
obtained training data Γnturn in the driver profile table, where
n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and N is the number of drivers the adversary
had learned about. If there is a close match, s/he exploits
γxturn as an input for machine classifiers with the training set
as driver profile table. As a result, s/he identifies the driver
x to be i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (Sections III-D–III-E). Finally, s/he
appends γxturn to his/her driver profile table with label i.
Meanwhile, based on GMM, if γxturn does not closely match
any of those in the driver profile table, s/he constructs a new
driver training dataset for driver x.
Note that the adversary needs to have driver profile table
constructed before identifying driver x. Due to this require-
ment, existing driver fingerprinting schemes with CAN data
assume that the adversary already has a complete training
set for all the targeted drivers. However, this assumption is
difficult to be met in practice. In the following sections, to
focus on the design and discussion of Dri-Fi, for now, we
assume that the adversary does have the complete training set;
the same assumption as in previous studies. We will present
in Section III-F how such an assumption can be relaxed by
using our context-based approach for constructing the training
set from scratch.
B. Data Collection and Pre-processing
Dri-Fi continuously collects the raw IMU data ϕraw =
{gyroraw, accraw,magraw} — raw readings from the gy-
roscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer, respectively —
throughout a trip. To accommodate different postures of the
mobile device, which Dri-Fi utilizes for data collection,
inside the car, Dri-Fi aligns the coordinate of the IMU
readings using the magnetometer [26].4 Specifically, Dri-Fi
always aligns the device’s coordinate with the geo-frame/earth
coordinate so as to maintain the consistency of analysis. This
allows the data which Dri-Fi uses for driver fingerprinting
to be not affected by the device postures, i.e., it works under
various placements/circumstances.
Once the coordinate-aligned data of the gyroscope and
accelerometer sensors have been collected, Dri-Fi smooths
and trims them to prepare for further analyses. If the device
which Dri-Fi uses is a smartphone, its handling by the user
may cause high-power noises on the gyroscope and accelerom-
eter sensors. Abnormal road conditions (e.g., potholes) may
also incur a similar level of noise. Therefore, Dri-Fi first
removes those noises by filtering out abnormal spikes in the
data. Dri-Fi then smooths each IMU sensor (gyroscope and
4If Dri-Fi were to use sensor measurements from an OBD-II dongle,
since that device’s posture would not change, Dri-Fi need not align the
coordinates, thus not requiring the use of the magnetometer.
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Figure 2. Left turn extraction from smoothed gyroscope readings.
accelerometer) data stream by using a low-pass filter to remove
high-frequency noises.
C. Extraction of Left/Right Turns
Dri-Fi trims the smoothed data further by retaining the
IMU measurements acquired only during a left/right turn,
ϕturn = {gyroturn, accturn,magturn}, i.e., smoothed IMU
data of only left/right turning maneuvers. In other words, mea-
surements taken when the driver constantly drove on a straight
road, or when the car stopped to wait for traffic lights or stop
signs are all discarded. Among the various maneuvers (e.g.,
turns, lane changes, acceleration/deceleration), the reason for
Dri-Fi’s focus on data from left and right turns is that the
vehicle/driver’s actions/maneuvers for making turns are much
less likely affected by the car in front (i.e., traffic condition)
than others. For example, deceleration of a vehicle would
depend on the car in front, whereas left/right turns are less
likely to depend on it.
In order to extract data only related to left/right turns, among
the three IMU sensors — gyroscope, accelerometer, and (per-
haps) magnetometer — Dri-Fi uses the (coordinate-aligned)
gyroscope’s yaw rate reading as it reflects the vehicle’s angular
velocity around its vertical axis, i.e., the vehicle’s rotational
inertia.5 Note, however, that a non-zero value from the gy-
roscope does not necessarily represent a left/right turn, since
there exist other (similar) maneuvers such as lane changes and
U-turns which incur similar results [26]. Hence, based on the
gyroscope readings, Dri-Fi extracts data of only left/right
turns in the following two steps: it
S1. Recognizes whether or not a steering maneuver — which
we refer to as maneuvers (left/right turns, lane changes,
U-turn, etc.) that suddenly change the vehicle’s heading
direction significantly — was made;
S2. Determines whether the steering maneuver was a
left/right turn and, if so, extracts sensor readings acquired
during that turn.
S1. Recognizing steering maneuvers. Dri-Fi recognizes
the occurrence of a steering maneuver when the yaw rate
readings from the gyroscope form a “bump-shape”. When
a car changes its direction by making a left turn, as shown
in Fig. 2, the yaw rate reading from the gyroscope first
decreases, reaches its minimum peak, and finally rises back
5Accelerometer readings after the coordinate alignment would only show
the changes in the longitudinal/lateral acceleration in reference to the vehicle’s
heading direction.
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Figure 3. Changes in the vehicle’s accelerations and heading angle.
to approximately 0 rad/s when the left turn is completed. For
a right turn, everything would be the opposite to a left turn;
increase, reach the maximum, and decrease. Depending on
how the coordinates are aligned, a negative bump may reflect
a right turn, not a left turn. However, in this paper, we consider
the yaw rate to increase when rotated clock-wise. Based on this
observation, Dri-Fi determines that a steering maneuver has
occurred if the absolute yaw rate exceeds a certain threshold,
δbump, which is empirically set to 0.15 rad/s. Note that
without the threshold (δbump), even a small movement of the
steering wheel would cause Dri-Fi to mis-detect a steering
maneuver. Thus, Dri-Fi marks the start time/point of that
steering maneuver as sstart when the absolute yaw rate, |Y |,
exceeded δbump for the first time. Also, Dri-Fi marks the
end point, send, as when |Y | first drops back below δbump.
Since the steering would in fact have started a bit before sstart
and ended a bit later than send, where |Y | ≈ 0 as shown in
Fig. 2, Dri-Fi moves points sstart and send backwards and
forwards, respectively, until |Y | ≈ 0. As a result, Dri-Fi
interprets a steering maneuver to have made at a time within
s = [sstart, send].
S2. Filtering left/right turns. The steering maneuver ex-
tracted in S1 may be comprised of not only left/right turns
but also lane changes or U-turns, since those maneuvers yield
similar bump-shaped yaw rate readings. In order to extract
only left/right turns, as in [26], Dri-Fi derives the change in
the vehicle’s heading angle, which is defined as the difference
in the vehicle’s heading angle between the start and the end
of a steering maneuver. Fig. 3 shows an example vehicle
trajectory during a right turn where three IMU sensor readings
were acquired at times t = sstart + {Ts, 2Ts, 3Ts}, i.e.,
sampled with frequency of 1/Ts. As in step S1, let t = sstart
be the time when the vehicle was detected to have started the
turn. Since the yaw rate readings from the gyroscope represent
the vehicle’s angular velocity around the vertical (Z) axis,
the change in the vehicle’s heading angle after time nTs has
elapsed since sstart, θ[nTs], can be approximated as
θ[nTs] ≈ θ[(n− 1)Ts] + YnTs =
n∑
k=1
YkTs, (1)
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Figure 4. Interpolated gyroscope readings.
where Yn denotes the n-th yaw rate reading since t = sstart.
Therefore, at the end of making a right turn, the eventual
change in the vehicle’s heading angle, θfinal = θ[send−sstart]
would be approximately 90◦ whereas at the end of a left turn it
would be -90◦. This change in the vehicle’s heading angle is a
good indicator for determining whether the vehicle has made a
left/right turn, since for lane changes, θfinal ≈ 0◦ whereas for
U-turns, θfinal ≈ 180◦. Thus, Dri-Fi calculates the θfinal
of a detected steering maneuver (made during sstart ∼ send),
and only retains it such that 70◦ ≤ |θfinal| ≤ 110◦, i.e., ap-
proximately ±90◦. Note that since left/right turns usually take
a short period of time (<3 seconds), drifting in the gyroscope
during a turn [27] does not affect Dri-Fi’s performance.
As a result, whenever the driver makes a left/right turn,
Dri-Fi can acquire a sensor data stream (i.e., gyroscope
and accelerometer readings) which was output only during
the turn, i.e., during s = [sstart, send]. However, since dif-
ferent road geometries may result in different turning radii,
the length of the readings may vary, which may affect the
performance of Dri-Fi. Thus, in order to make Dri-Fi’s
fingerprinting accuracy independent of path selection and only
driver-dependent, we interpolate the sensor data stream into a
fixed length. This also facilitates Dri-Fi to fingerprint the
driver even when using two different devices that may have
different sampling rates.
Fig. 4 shows the gyroscope readings of 12 different drivers’
left and right turns after interpolation; we will later elaborate in
Section IV on how we collected them. Near-equivalent shapes
of the gyroscope readings indicate that via interpolation, the
analyses can be done from a consistent vantage point, despite
turns being made on different road geometries. We will later
show through evaluations that since the variance in left turn
radii is usually much higher than that in right turns — as right
turns usually start from only one lane — without such an
interpolation, Dri-Fi’s fingerprinting accuracy drops more
when using left-turn data than when using right-turn data.
D. Maneuver-based Fingerprinting
Whenever driver x (whose identity is not yet determined)
makes a left/right turn, Dri-Fi acquires an IMU sensor
data stream ϕxturn. The main challenge in fingerprinting x is
determining which features to extract from the data stream.
Feature extraction. When drivers make either a left or right
turn, one might notice that some drivers have their unique
pattern in making the turn. Capturing such a pattern, Dri-Fi
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Figure 5. Dri-Fi’s construction of feature vector.
extracts the following three new features from the filtered IMU
sensor data for driver fingerprinting:
F1. Acceleration along the end-of-turn axis (Aeot);
F2. Deviation of F1 (∆Aeot); and
F3. Deviation of the raw yaw rate (∆Yraw).
As depicted in Fig. 3, we define the start-of-turn (SOT) axis
as the axis/direction in which the vehicle was detected to have
started its turn (direction at time sstart). In reference to the
SOT axis, we define the end-of-turn (EOT) axis as the one
orthogonal to the SOT axis. That is, regardless of the change
in the vehicle’s heading angle after the turn (e.g., 95◦ for a
right turn), by definition, the EOT axis is set perpendicular to
the SOT axis.
F1. Acceleration along the EOT axis. The acceleration
along the EOT axis is an interesting yet powerful feature in
Dri-Fi since it represents both 1) how much the driver turns
his/her steering wheel and 2) at that moment how hard the
driver presses the brake/acceleration pedal during the left/right
turn. In other words, it reflects one’s (unique) turning style.
We will later show through extensive evaluations that the
features we use for Dri-Fi do not depend on the vehicle
type or route but only on the driver’s unique maneuvering
style. Note that instantaneous acceleration, which we refer to
as the acceleration along the vehicle’s heading axis, measured
during a turn would only reflect the driver’s input/actions on
the brake/acceleration pedal but not on the steering wheel.
Similarly, the instantaneous yaw rate, i.e., the angular velocity
of the vehicle, measured from the gyroscope sensor would
only reflect the driver’s actions on the steering wheel.
For deriving the vehicle’s acceleration along the EOT
axis when nTs seconds has elapsed since sstart, Aeot[nTs],
Dri-Fi utilizes the vehicle’s instantaneous acceleration,
A[nTs], at that moment (obtained from the accelerometer) and
its change in the heading angle, θ[nTs] (extracted from the
gyroscope) as:
Aeot[nTs] = A[nTs]sin(θ[nTs]). (2)
In addition to the acceleration along the EOT axis, the value
along the SOT axis may also be used. However, since the
information Dri-Fi would obtain from the accelerations
along the SOT axis will be redundant when those along the
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Figure 6. Different autocorrelations depending on the driver’s turning style.
EOT axis are already available, we do not consider them as
features in Dri-Fi; this also reduces the feature space.
As an alternative to Aeot, one can think of using cen-
tripetal/lateral acceleration, which would be perpendicular to
the vehicle’s instantaneous acceleration (A). However, since
the centripetal acceleration is affected by the turning radius,
whereas the acceleration along the end-of-turn axis is not, we
do not consider this for features in Dri-Fi.
F2–F3. Deviations of Aeot and raw yaw rate. Dri-Fi
derives not only Aeot but also ∆Aeot, i.e., difference be-
tween the subsequent acceleration values along the EOT axis.
Since ∆Aeot reflects how aggressively the driver concurrently
changes his steering and pedal actions during a turn, this
feature captures the driver’s aggressiveness during the turn.
In addition to ∆Aeot, Dri-Fi also determines the devi-
ations in the raw yaw rate measurements, ∆Yraw. Note that
in order to accurately extract left/right turns, Dri-Fi pre-
processed the data with a low-pass filter. However, as the
turns are already extracted, in order to not lose the accurate
understanding/interpretation of how aggressively the driver
turns his steering wheel, Dri-Fi also derives ∆Yraw; the
driver’s aggressiveness shown from the low-pass filtered data
would have been reflected in F2. In addition to the driver’s
aggressiveness of turning the steering wheel, this feature also
captures how stable the driver maintains an angle during the
turn(s) and thus helps Dri-Fi’s driver fingerprinting.
Feature Vector Construction. To construct the feature
vector γturn for classification and thus fingerprinting, Dri-Fi
transforms F1–F3 as follows:
1. Upon detection of a turn, as shown in Fig. 5, Dri-Fi
divides the IMU sensor measurements (acquired during
the turn) into 5 stages, each with an identical duration.
2. For each stage, Dri-Fi determines F1–F3.
3. For each of F1–F3, Dri-Fi determines its {10, 25, 50,
75, 90}-th percentiles and autocorrelations at 1–10 lags
and aggregates them for constructing a feature vector.6
Note that Dri-Fi generates an instance with such a feature
vector per (detected) turn. With the percentiles, Dri-Fi
understands the distributions of F1–F3 in each stage of turn.
Meanwhile, a more interesting and powerful feature for
Dri-Fi in fingerprinting the driver is the autocorrelations
6Dri-Fi does not use statistics such as mean, variance, and min./max.,
since (based on our observation) they do not help in fingerprinting the driver;
they only increase the size of the feature space, unnecessarily.
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Figure 7. Correlogram of feature F1 for two drivers.
of F1–F3 in each stage of turns. Fig. 6 shows an example of
two different drivers making a right turn. When making the
right turn, one can see that driver 1 started turning his steering
wheel during stage 1 of the turn whereas driver 2 started it
later during stage 3. As shown in Fig. 6, which also illustrates
the accelerations along the EOT axis (Aeot) during stage 1,
one can see that an early turn from driver 1 incurs non-zero
values of Aeot in stage 1 of the turn. On the other hand, since
driver 2 drives further on a straight line along the SOT axis, his
Aeot values in stage 1 would approximately be 0. Similarly,
values of F2 and F3 would also remain 0 for driver 2, but
not for driver 1. As a result, the autocorrelations of F1–F3 for
driver 1 would show significantly different values from those
for driver 2, i.e., drivers’ different maneuvering styles lead to
different F1–F3 autocorrelations during a turn.
Then, are these autocorrelation values of F1–F3 different
enough between drivers to be considered as a driver’s fin-
gerprint? Also, for a given driver, are those values consistent
across multiple left/right turns? Fig. 7 shows the boxplots of
F1 autocorrelations for two drivers — who participated in our
evaluations — during their first stage of left turns. We will
later elaborate on the evaluation settings in Section IV. One
can see that since the tendencies of drivers moving straight or
turning the steering wheel early/late at the early stages of turns
were different, the autocorrelations (at different lags) between
the two drivers were obviously distinguishable. Moreover,
one can see that although the driver was making those left
turns at different times and places, the variances in some
autocorrelation lags were quite low, i.e., stable. Not only the
first stage but also stages 2∼5 showed a similar distinctiveness
and stability. This shows that the autocorrelations of F1–F3
are not only distinct among drivers but also quite stable for a
given driver, i.e., drivers’ turning styles are relatively constant
and distinct, so as to function as the core for Dri-Fi in
fingerprinting the drivers.
Driver fingerprinting after a single turn. Using
the constructed feature vector γxturn as an input and
driver profile table as the training dataset for machine classi-
fiers (e.g., Random Forest, SVM, Naive Bayes), Dri-Fi can
fingerprint the driver as soon as the driver has made either
a left or right turn, which we refer to as a “maneuver-based
approach”. As shown in Fig. 1, driver profile table stores the
drivers’ identities (e.g., Alice, Bob) and their corresponding
driving data, Γturn. For now, we assume that the targeted
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Figure 8. Formulating the training set (driver profile table) from scratch.
driver/victim is within driver profile table, and this table is
given to the adversary. Note that existing approaches for driver
fingerprinting also assume this. Since this does not hold in
some practical circumstances, we will discuss in Section III-F
how the adversary may construct/obtain driver profile table
from scratch via unsupervised machine learning.
E. Trip-Based Fingerprinting
Albeit quite effective, when trying to fingerprint the driver
within just one turn, some false positives/negatives may occur,
possibly due to a sudden change in traffic signals, interruptions
from pedestrians, etc. Hence, in order to reduce/remove such
false positives/negatives, Dri-Fi can exploit the “accumu-
lated” data obtained from multiple left/right turns within a
trip that the driver is making, i.e., trip-based approach. Note
that during a trip the driver remains the same.
One way the adversary might achieve this via Dri-Fi is
by exploiting the Naive Bayes classifier, which is a simple
probabilistic classifier based on the Bayes’ theorem. For a
given vehicle driven by N different drivers, assume that the
adversary has a training set composed of several instances
labeled as one of D1, · · · , DN . Then, within the trip in which
the adversary attempts to fingerprint the driver, as the driver
makes more turns, i.e., as more instances are collected, the
adversary can estimate the maximum posterior probability
(MAP) and thus predict the driver to be Dpred as:
Dpred = arg max
k∈{1,··· ,N}
p (Dk)
n∏
i=1
p (Ti|Dk), (3)
where n is the number of vehicle turns made up to the point
of examination during the trip. Here, p(Ti|Dk) represents
the likelihood that the (measured) i-th turn, Ti, would have
occurred, given driver Dk is driving the vehicle. Even though
the adversary assumes that the prior probability, p(Dk) is
equivalent across the (potential) drivers, i.e., each driver has
an equal probability of driving that vehicle, we will later
show through evaluations that the adversary can fingerprint
the driver with higher accuracy than just using one turn,
although, in most cases, one turn was sufficient in correctly
fingerprinting the driver.
F. Training Set Formulation
We now present how to construct driver profile table from
scratch, thus enhancing Dri-Fi’s practicability. In construct-
ing a valid training set, there exist two main challenges: 1)
determine whether the new collected data comes from a driver
the adversary had already learned about and 2) for the labeled
data, exactly know who that driver would be. For the latter,
without knowing this, the adversary would only be able to
label the data as some variable Di rather than the driver’s
actual identity (e.g., D1=“Alice”); see Fig. 8 (left).
Determining a new driver. As illustrated in Fig. 1, once the
adversary equipped with Dri-Fi collects γxturn from driver
x, Dri-Fi determines whether driver x would be one of the
known/learned drivers or a new (unknown/unlearned) driver,
i.e,. whether x belongs to driver profile table. In the former,
the adversary can expand the existing training set, whereas
in the latter, he would have to construct a new training set
for driver x. Such a process is essential, especially when the
adversary starts, for the first time, to fingerprint the driver of
a vehicle, i.e., starting from scratch.
Here, we briefly discuss how the adversary can indeed
utilize unsupervised machine learning to correctly cluster/label
γxturn to either an already-known or a new driver. What the
adversary may do is label γxturn based on its log-likelihood
obtained from a Gaussian mixture model (GMM). GMM
is a combination of Gaussian component densities that are
used for modeling the probability distribution of continuous
measurements; see [28] for more details.
Suppose the adversary starts to fingerprint the driver(s). At
first, since he has an empty training set, he first builds a GMM
model, M1, based on the training data Γ1turn acquired during
the vehicle’s first trip and labels it as (some) driver D1. Then,
during the next trip, when the adversary acquires γxturn, he
calculates the log-likelihood of γxturn given M1. Accordingly,
if the log-likelihood is high, meaning that γxturn is likely to
be output from driver D1, Dri-Fi appends γxturn to the
associated training set Γ1turn. On the other hand, if the log-
likelihood is low, γxturn is likely to have been generated by a
new driver D2 . Accordingly, Dri-Fi makes a new training
set Γ2turn. In such a way, the adversary would able to construct
the initial version of driver profile table (e.g., Fig. 8 (left)).
Accurately labeling the data. As shown in Fig. 8, the
adversary can construct the training dataset more concretely if
he knows exactly who D1 is (e.g., D1=“Alice”). This can be
achieved not only via oversight but also based on other context
information. For example, if the adversary knows that Alice
always drives to work for an hour at 9:00 am on weekdays,
the data being collected during 9:00∼10:00 am is more likely
to reflect Alice’s rather than other’s driving behavior. Other
than time, useful context information such as location, phone
usage patterns, DNS traffic pattern may also be utilized in
verifying that the driver is indeed “Alice”. Note, however, that
these are only valid when that context becomes available and is
valid (e.g., on weekends, we are not sure that Alice is driving).
Thus, we use context only for constructing the training dataset
of Dri-Fi, but not for the actual fingerprinting.
In fact, such an approach would not only make the adversary
build a concrete training set but also let him estimate the prior
probability of a driver driving the vehicle — p(Dk) in Eq. (3)
— and thus increase the fingerprinting accuracy.
In Section IV, we will show that the adversary can con-
struct/obtain a well-formulated training set via this GMM
approach. We also show through extensive evaluations that
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Figure 9. Different driving environments.
even when the training dataset obtains a few instances with
incorrect labels (IV-F), i.e., a (slightly) defective training set
due to the adversary’s mistake, he may still be able to identify
the driver with high accuracy.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
To validate whether Dri-Fi accurately fingerprints the
driver, we evaluated two imperative aspects of Dri-Fi:
whether the derived features of Dri-Fi are 1) dependent only
on the driver and 2) remain constant with various changing
factors, e.g. car and/or route. To validate these, we started
from a small-scale experiment where we varied/controlled
different factors such as driver, car, route, which may (or
may not) affect Dri-Fi’s performance. Once validated, to
evaluate how Dri-Fi’s performance scales with high number
of drivers, we conducted a large-scale experiment with more
drivers driving in their own choice of car and routes. Overall,
our driving data collection took 4 months and had more than
116 hours of driving data obtained from urban/suburban areas.
The accumulated driving milage was 1,688 miles.
Data-collection methodology. The data-collection module
of Dri-Fi was implemented as an Android app and was
installed on various Android smartphones including Google
Pixel, Nexus 5X, Samsung Galaxy S5, and Samsung Note 5.
We recruited 12 (9 male and 3 female) drivers with an age
span of 22–50. For collecting the data, we asked the drivers
to 1) ensure the app is turned on before driving and 2) upload
the data after finishing a trip. According to our survey after
data collection, none of the participants indicated that our data
collection app affected their normal driving pattern.
Since our system does not require any personal information
from the users, the Institutional Review Boards (IRB) of our
university classified this effort as non-regulated.
Tested vehicle and routes. The selection of vehicle and
road were only controlled in our small-scale experiment.
Specifically, to verify the factors which affect Dri-Fi’s
performance, we asked two recruited drivers to drive a Honda
Sedan and a Ford SUV. In the large-scale experiment, to
validate that the derived features in Dri-Fi and thus its
fingerprinting do not depend on the vehicle of choice, we
allowed all participants to drive their own vehicle(s). As a
result, we collected data from 10 cars of 7 different models:
Honda Accord Sedan, Honda CRV SUV, Toyota Camry Sedan,
Ford Explorer SUV, Hyundai Elantra Sedan, Jeep Compass
Differentiated Factor(s) Constant Factor(s) Acc.
T1. Car Driver, Route Low
T2. Route Driver, Car Low
T3. Car, Route Driver Low
T4. Driver Car, Route High
T5. Driver, Car Route High
T6. Driver, Route Car High
T7. Driver, Car, Route (None) High
Table I
SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS.
SUV, and Toyota Corolla Sedan. Moreover, the routes were
also freely chosen by the driver which included those in a
suburban area with less traffic or a metropolitan area with
heavy traffic; examples shown in Fig. 9.
B. Factor Analysis & Experimental Design
To verify that the fingerprinting accuracy of Dri-Fi only
depends on the driver, not on the car or route, we first
conducted a factor analysis via a small-scale experiment. As
shown in Table I, we conducted 6 experiments, T1–T6, with
same/different drivers, cars, and/or routes. For T7 (the large-
scale experiment) where every factor was varied and uncon-
trolled, we will discuss later on how Dri-Fi performed.
Test cases. For tests T1–T6, we varied/controlled the three
factors as follows:
• Driver Factor: For test cases T4–T6 where the driver was
differentiated, two different drivers were asked to drive
a same/different car with specified instructions when
needed, e.g., whether to drive on a pre-determined route.
• Car Factor: For test cases T1, T3, and T5 in which the
car type was varied, we used two different cars: Honda
Accord Sedan and a Ford Explorer SUV.
• Route Factor: For test cases T1, T4, and T5, where the
route was fixed, we asked the drivers to drive around
campus along the pre-determined route. For other test
cases (T2, T3, and T6) where the route was differentiated,
the route was solely determined by the drivers.
If Dri-Fi’s constructed features only depend on the driver
factor, i.e., dependent on only the driver’s unique turning style,
Dri-Fi’s performance in test cases T1–T3 would be low
whereas in T4–T6, it should be high.
Classification. For each test case, we acquired data
via Dri-Fi from two different trips, which differ in
driver/car/route or a combination thereof (as shown in Table I).
As the two trips (per test case) have distinct factors, we
labeled the vehicle turns based on which trip they occurred.
For example, in T1 where “car” was the only differentiated
factor between the two trips, although the driver was identical,
the vehicle turn data from each trip were labeled differently
as 0 and 1, i.e., binary. Similarly in T6 where the “driver”
and “route” were the differentiated factors, turns from each
trip were again labeled 0 and 1. Based on the collected data
from the two trips of cases T1–T6, we trained the classifiers
using 90% of the turns and leave the remaining 10% as
the test set. To obtain an accurate estimate of the model
prediction performance, we used 10-fold cross validation. For
each test case, as turns were from two different trips (with
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Figure 10. Classification accuracy for test cases T1–T6 using SVM and
Random Forest.
different drivers/cars/routes), we used binary classification.
The classifiers we used for testing T1–T6 were Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and a 100-tree Random Forest.
Performance. Fig. 10 plots accuracies of Dri-Fi in finger-
printing the driver based one single turn in T1–T6, when using
SVM and Random Forest. Since the classification only needed
to be binary, the classification accuracy of random guessing is
50%, which is shown as a horizontal dotted line.
One can see that for test cases T1–T3, although the vehicle
and/or the route were different, Dri-Fi showed a very low
classification accuracy: 66.6%, 64.2%, 61.1% using SVM, and
66.6%, 60.4%, 61.1% using Random Forest in cases T1–T3,
respectively. Such a result can, in fact, be interpreted as having
a similar accuracy as when it is guessed randomly. This also
implies that regardless of the car or route used/taken, if the
driver is identical, Dri-Fi gets confused.
When the ”driver” factor was changed as in test cases T4–
T6, one can see from Fig. 10 that the classification accuracy of
Dri-Fi was much higher: 96.3%, 91.7%, 94% using SVM,
and 95%, 91.7%, 100% using Random Forest in cases T4–
T6, respectively. Such a high classification accuracy was due
to the fact that between the two trips of T4–T6, the drivers
were different.
Based on these results, we can conclude that the features de-
rived by Dri-Fi depends only on the driver and not on other
factors such as car and/or route, thus functioning as the key
for accurate driver fingerprinting. Moreover, Dri-Fi shows
consistent performance across different machine classifiers.
C. Large-scale Experiment
To further evaluate Dri-Fi’s performance with more
drivers, and to verify whether its derived features for a given
driver remain consistent across different routes, we conducted
a large-scale experiment: we used all the sensor data acquired
from the 12 participants who drove 10 different cars. As most
of these participants drove different cars on different routes,
test case T7 represents such a setting.
In T7, since there were more than 2 drivers, when using
SVM and Random Forest, we performed a multi-class classi-
fication. To achieve this, we examined it through one vs. one
reduction rather than one vs. all since the former reflects more
accurate results than the latter [29]. In the dataset, feature
vectors of turns were labeled depending on who the driver
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Figure 11. Dri-Fi’s accuracy in fingerprinting 5, 8, and 12 drivers within
one vehicle turn using SVM and Random Forest.
was. Again, 10-fold cross validation was performed for an
accurate performance measure.
Maneuver-based approach. We first evaluate how well
Dri-Fi identifies 5, 8, and 12 drivers using a maneuver-
based approach. Fig. 11 plots Dri-Fi’s accuracy in fin-
gerprinting 5, 8, and 12 different drivers using SVM and
Random Forest. One can see that within only one left/right
turn, Dri-Fi can fingerprint the driver with 90.5%, 83.1%,
and 72.8% accuracies across 5, 8, and 12 drivers, respectively,
using SVM. When Random Forest is used, the fingerprinting
accuracies were shown to be 90.8%, 83.5%, and 74.1% across
the same driver sets. Although only mobile IMU sensors
were used by Dri-Fi, thanks to its new features, Dri-Fi
was able to identify the driver even though the number of
drivers got larger; much better than random guessing. Such an
achievement was made by observing only one left/right turn!
Trip-based approach. As discussed in Section III-E, in-
stead of trying to fingerprint the driver based on one turn,
the adversary may attempt to do it by accumulating sensor
data of multiple turns collected within the trip, i.e., trip-
based approach. To evaluate how well an adversary exploiting
Dri-Fi may fingerprint the driver with such an approach,
we evaluated Dri-Fi as follows. Per iteration, from our 12-
driver driving dataset, we randomly selected one trip made
by some driver; each driver made at least 2 trips. Then, we
first randomly permuted the vehicle turns made within that
trip and then considered those as our test set. Vehicle turns
made in all other trips were considered as our training set.
In predicting who the driver was in the (randomly) selected
trip, i.e., the driver of the test set, we used the Naive Bayes
classifier, which predicts the label based on the maximum a
posteriori (as in Eq.(3)). The prior probability was set to be
uniform. We performed such an evaluation 500 times.
Fig. 12 plots Dri-Fi’s accuracy in identifying the driver
correctly for the 500 iterations using a trip-based approach,
when the number of candidate drivers were 5, 8, and 12.
For evaluating the first two cases with 5 and 8 drivers, per
iteration, they (as well as their trip/turn data) were randomly
chosen from the total of 12 drivers. One can see that as more
left/right turns were observed and analyzed by Dri-Fi, its
classification accuracy continuously increased. After observing
8 left/right turns, Dri-Fi achieved fingerprinting accuracies
of 96.6%, 95.4%, and 95.3% across 5, 8, and 12 drivers,
respectively, which obviously is a great improvement over
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Figure 12. Classification accuracy of trip-based approach using Naive Bayes.
Left Turn Right Turn
SVM(%) RF(%) SVM(%) RF(%)
w/ Interpolation 73.1 78.0 74.1 74.3
w/o Interpolation 65.2 72.0 71.5 72.2
Average difference -6.95 -2.35
Table II
EFFICACY OF DATA INTERPOLATION.
the “maneuver-based approach”, i.e., fingerprinting after one
left/right turn. Since the way the drivers made their left/right
turns was occasionally inconsistent, one more turn made by
the driver did not necessarily increase Dri-Fi’s performance,
i.e., performance did not monotonically increase. However,
since the drivers made most of their turns according to their
usual tendency/habit, ultimately the accuracy improved. Note
that the accuracy of fingerprinting the driver via Naive Bayes
after only one turn was a bit lower than when using other
classifiers such as SVM or Random Forest due to its (naive)
independence assumptions.
D. Efficacy of Interpolation
As discussed in Section III-C, to make Dri-Fi’s finger-
printing as independent as possible from the road geometry
in which the turns are made, we interpolate the data to a
fixed length. To evaluate the efficacy of such an interpolation,
we evaluated Dri-Fi’s accuracy across 12 drivers when not
executing such an interpolation.
Table II summarizes how Dri-Fi performed when fin-
gerprinting the 12 drivers based on only left and right turns
with/without interpolation. One can observe that when the data
from different trips were not interpolated, the performance of
Dri-Fi dropped. The reason for such a drop was that road
geometries for different turns (even for the same driver) were
not identical, i.e., the turning radii are different. So, through
interpolation, Dri-Fi was able to remove the possible in-
fluence of the differences in turning radii, and thus achieve
more accurate driver fingerprinting. Note that a driver’s turning
radii can vary depending on where s/he is driving. Here, an
interesting observation is that Dri-Fi’s accuracy dropped
more when identifying the driver via left turn(s) than via
right turn(s). This was because the turning radii for left turns
normally have higher variations between them than for right
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Figure 13. Using GMM for training set formulation.
turns; left turns can start from multiple lanes, whereas right
turns (mostly) start from the rightmost lane.
E. Training Set Formulation
In Section III-F, we discussed how the adversary may
use GMM to construct/obtain the training dataset for driver
fingerprinting from scratch. To validate this, we considered the
following case. Suppose that driver D1 (w/o known identity)
was the first to drive the vehicle since the adversary started
to fingerprint its driver. Thus, the adversary constructs his
initial training dataset, Γ1turn with label D1. In such a case,
we examined what the GMM log-likelihood would be for the
data collected from a new trip given Γ1turn.
Fig. 13(a) plots what the log-likelihood values were when
data from 12 different trips, Trip1–Trip12 (each chosen from
the 12 different drivers’ trips) were considered as the test
set, thus being examined against the GMM of Γ1turn. We
constructed Γ1turn based on one of driver D1’s trips, which
was not included in the 12-trip test set. One can see that for
only the data in Trip2, the log-likelihood was positive whereas
for all others the values were negative or even negative infinite.
This was because the driver of Trip2 was D1. Such a result
shows that by observing the GMM likelihood, the adversary
can determine whether or not the newly collected data has
been output by an existing driver in his training dataset. In
this case, in Dri-Fi, the adversary would append the newly
collected data from Trip2 to its initial dataset, Γ1turn.
This time, we randomly chose another trip from our 12-
driver dataset and considered that as the adversary’s new initial
training set, i.e., different D1 and Γ1turn (than the previous
ones). We again considered the test set to be composed of
12 different trip data, but this time, made by drivers except
for the chosen D1. Fig. 13(b) plots the GMM log-likelihood
values of data in the test set given the new Γ1turn. One can
see that, since there were no trips within the test set taken by
the same person as D1, all showed negative/negative-infinite
likelihoods. In such a case, Dri-Fi would determine that the
newly collected data was output by a new driver, which he had
not learned about, and thus construct a new training dataset
for that driver.
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Figure 14. Classification accuracy with perr % erroneous training dataset.
F. Erroneous Training Dataset
When forming the training set via GMM, the standard for
clustering new data was whether the GMM log-likelihood is
positive or not. However, such a threshold setting may not
always be reliable. Thus, to understand and evaluate how
Dri-Fi’s performance will be affected when the adversary
wrongly labels a turn while constructing the training dataset,
e.g., a turn was made by driver 1 but the adversary labels it as
by driver 2, from our dataset of 5 drivers, we arbitrarily picked
and labeled some turns to be made by any of the 5 drivers.
The number of arbitrarily picked turns with erroneous labels
were varied via parameter perr, which denotes the percentage
of such erroneous labels. For this evaluation, we present the
results obtained via SVM.
Fig. 14 shows how Dri-Fi’s fingerprinting accuracy
changed for perr=0∼20%. Even when the training dataset
for Dri-Fi contains 20% of erroneous labels due to the
adversary’s mistake, the adversary can still achieve 70.7%
fingerprinting accuracy within only one turn. Despite the erro-
neous labels, such an accuracy can be increased further using
a trip-based approach. Such a result implies that the adversary
may not always have to be 100% accurate in constructing the
training dataset in order to accurately fingerprint the driver
with Dri-Fi, which is a serious threat.
G. Overhead of Dri-Fi
The additional overheads such as the CPU usage and energy
consumption of Dri-Fi on the victim’s device may render
the driver fingerprinting process noticeable by the victim.
To measure CPU usage, we recorded the CPU usage on
both Google Pixel phone and Nexus 5X phone by using
Android adb shell. To evaluate the extra overhead incurred by
Dri-Fi’s data-collection module, which requires a bit higher
sampling rate than usual, we compared the CPU usage of an
application running with a normal IMU sampling rate (for
detecting screen rotation) and with the sampling rate which
Dri-Fi uses: 100Hz. As shown in Fig. 15(a), albeit the
increased sampling rate of Dri-Fi, there were only small
increases in the CPU usage; specifically, 2% increase on a
Pixel phone and 3.4% increase on a Nexus 5X phone. Since
such an increased CPU usage was also occasionally observable
even when running with a normal sampling rate, the increased
CPU usage may not necessarily indicate (or let the victim
know) that Dri-Fi is running.
We also examined the additionally consumed energy of
using Dri-Fi by measuring the current drawn in the smart-
phones. Fig. 15(b) shows the energy consumption on Pixel
Pixel Nexus0
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Figure 15. Overhead of data collection app.
while Dri-Fi was running in the background and utility ap-
plications (e.g. Google maps) were running in the foreground.
Our results indicate that compared to the case where Google
maps drew 767.10mA of current for navigation, Dri-Fi
drew only 49.60mA additional current. This 6.5% extra energy
consumption would be too minimal for the victim to notice.
Such small increases in CPU usage and energy consumption
imply that if the compromised app/software originally has high
overhead (e.g., navigation and social apps), then this marginal
increase of these overhead caused by Dri-Fi would be much
less obvious. As a result, it will be even harder for the victim
to notice such overheads.
V. RELATED WORK
A. Device/User Tracking on Mobile Devices
While many researchers studied privacy invasion on mobile
devices, their practicability in breaching the driver’s privacy
is limited by a common requirement: the mobile device’s
user/owner being tracked must also always be the driver.
A straightforward approach to identifying a mobile device
is to track its unique identifier, such as IMEI, ICCID (SIM
ID), etc., and/or cookies from its web browsers. However,
this approach is not practical since reading unique identifiers
requires the user’s permission and cookies can be easily
deleted by the device user. To evade these, stealthier ways
of tracking mobile devices have been explored. For example,
Dey et al. [10] and Bojinov et al. [11] have shown adversaries
to be able to track devices by utilizing the minor MEMS
imperfection of the accelerometer. Resilient browser tracking
approaches (e.g., evercookie [30]) have also shown a practical
way of tracking devices that are connected to the Internet.
All of the above approaches are effective in identifying a
device, but they share one common limitation in fingerprint-
ing a driver: they cannot match the driving data with the
user’s identity when the user is riding as a passenger. The
motivating scenarios discussed in Section II-C are exemplars
that the device-oriented approaches fail to fingerprint drivers.
Note that even recent in-car phone localization methods —
e.g., determining whether the phone is placed in the driver’s
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seat [31] — would also suffer from the same problem since
the driver’s phone can be placed anywhere in the car, e.g.,
inside a purse sitting in the passenger’s seat.
Researchers have also been able to track the mobile user’s
identity based on his/her behavioral pattern(s). For example,
Bo et al. [13] constructed a “touch-based biometric” based on
the user’s touch screen behavior and Herrmann et al. [14] used
the user’s DNS traffic pattern to track him/her. Like device-
oriented approaches, this type of tracking can also link the
user’s current behavior with his/her identity. Note, however,
that the user interacting with the device being tracked (while
driving) may not necessarily be the driver.
B. Driver Fingerprinting Based on CAN Data
Recently, various in-vehicle sensor data havebeen used to
fingerprint drivers [3, 4, 15–17, 32].
Enev et al. [3] investigated whether an adversary can
identify/fingerprint the driver via in-vehicle (specifically CAN)
data. By exploiting 18 or more types of CAN sensor data
(e.g., brake pedal position, throttle position, engine speed)
collected through the OBD-II port for at least 15 minutes,
the adversary was shown to be able to fingerprint the driver
with high accuracy. Similarly, the feasibility of fingerprinting
the driver based on CAN data was shown in [32].
Kwak et al. [17] also exploited CAN data for driver finger-
printing for an anti-theft purpose. In addition to the features
proposed in [3], they exploited the mechanical features of
automotive parts (e.g., transmission oil temperature), thus
enhancing the accuracy of driver fingerprinting.
Hallac et al. [4] exploited 12 different types of CAN data
for driver fingerprinting. Specifically, they proposed a classi-
fication algorithm by exploiting simple to complex features
such as mean, standard deviation, and spectral components of
the 12 different CAN sensor data. That way, they were able
to identify the driver with high accuracy within one turn, but
only when the number of different drivers were 2.
Van Ly et al. [15] also used in-car CAN data representing
acceleration, brake, and turn signals to identify the driver.
Other relevant work includes [16] which used not only CAN
data but also additional new features including the car-
following distance and the sound information when someone
speaks inside the car for driver identification.
These related studies have demonstrated the feasibility of
driver fingerprinting, but all of them are based on in-vehicle
data. Both accessing and interpreting/decoding CAN data —
i.e., knowing which CAN ID contains which sensor values and
how they are encoded — are non-trivial problems.
In contrast, Dri-Fi takes a very different approach from
existing driver fingerprinting schemes by identifying the driver
based solely on mobile IMUs. Since these are zero-permission
sensors and available in all commodity smartphones, some
off-the-shelf devices, and even in OBD-II dongles, from an
adversary’s point of view, the attack surface of fingerprinting
drivers is much larger than that covered by existing schemes.
For example, any malicious app installed on the victim’s
smartphone can collect the IMU data. Moreover, Dri-Fi
can achieve driver fingerprinting with high accuracy as soon
as the driver makes a single turn. Even though Dri-Fi can
sometimes be incorrect after the first turn, as the driver makes
more turns and thus Dri-Fi collects more data, its accuracy
of fingerprinting improves significantly.
VI. DISCUSSION
Number of drivers. We evaluated Dri-Fi with up to 12
drivers. The fact that an adversary can accurately fingerprint
the driver among such a number of candidates (even with
access to only IMUs) implies a serious potential privacy risk.
In most real-world scenarios, the maximum number of drivers
for a given vehicle may not even be that large. Privately
owned vehicles — the most common scenario — will most
probably be driven by only a few people, such as family
members. Although the accuracy of Dri-Fi’s maneuver-based
fingerprinting approach drops as the number of driver increases
(Fig. 10), Dri-Fi can offset such a deterioration via a trip-
based fingerprinting approach; as shown in Fig. 12, Dri-Fi
can boost the accuracy with increasing number of turns.
Countermeasures. To prevent an adversary from finger-
printing the driver via an IMU, one may add artificial noise
to the sensor readings. Addition of noise does not necessarily
have to be done continuously, but only when the driver is
anticipated to start his turn. For example, as in Fig. 2, when
the absolute gyroscope readings exceed the threshold, δbump,
the device can be configured to add noise. Accordingly, an
adversary exploiting Dri-Fi would be unable to extract
accurate measurements from a vehicle turn and thus fail
in driver fingerprinting. For smartphones, such an approach
should be implemented in the OS-level, if there are no other
apps using IMU sensors for “good purposes” while driving.
Another countermeasure (in case of a smartphone) is to request
permission for use of IMU sensors when installing the app, as
discussed in [27].
Limitations. With the coordinate alignment discussed in
Sec. III-B, Dri-Fi can analyze the data from a consis-
tent viewpoint, i.e., according to the geo-frame coordinate,
no matter what the posture of the device has. However, if
the device always moves during driving (e.g., the driver’s
smartwatch), it may introduce noise in the measurements, thus
rendering Dri-Fi to be less accurate. Moreover, depending
on the driver’s emotion, sense of urgency, and physical status,
Dri-Fi’s accuracy may vary as well. In fact, the false-
positives/negatives in Dri-Fi’s fingerprinting might occur for
these reasons. So, in future we would like to conduct a detailed
study of the effects of such factors on Dri-Fi’s accuracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented Dri-Fi, a driving data analytic
engine that an adversary can exploit to fingerprint the driver
within only one vehicle turn, and most importantly using
only zero-permission mobile IMUs. Dri-Fi achieves this
by capturing new representative features of a driver’s unique
way of making turns. Via extensive evaluations, Dri-Fi’s
extracted features are shown to represent the driver’s unique
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turning style and thus function as the key in fingerprinting
the driver. Such a feature of Dri-Fi implies a significant
expansion of the attack vector; an adversary can identify the
driver with access to not only in-car data but also to IMU-
equipped devices. More importantly, it implies a practical,
serious, and a yet uncovered privacy threat. Accordingly, we
suggest both academia and industry to be wary of such a threat
and thus make concerted efforts to develop countermeasures.
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